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Abstract
We examine a simple model of collusion under a single-object second-
price auction. Under the appropriate parameter conditions, in partic-
ular as long as collusion is neither too easy, nor too difficult, we find
that the optimal policy involves both an effective ceiling, as well as a
reserve price.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we examine the role of ceilings (i.e. bid-caps) and reserve prices
in controlling collusion in auctions. It is well recognized that auctions are
prone to collusive behavior among the bidders (see Graham and Marshall
(1987)). Given that auctions account for a large volume of economic ac-
tivity,1 policies aimed at preventing such collusion are of interest. Further,
given that ceilings and reserve prices seem to be rather widely used, in this
paper we focus attention on these two policies.
We consider a simple second-price auction with independent private val-
ues where the bidders may potentially collude. We examine the case where
the seller may impose a ceiling, as well as a reserve price. We characterize the
conditions under which the optimal policy involves both an effective ceiling,
and a reservation price. Thus interestingly an apparently anti-competitive
policy, i.e. the imposition of ceilings, may have a pro-competitive effect.
In the literature the role of bid-caps in collusive auctions is relatively
unexplored. It focuses on the case where there is no collusion e.g. Banerjee
and Chakroborty (2005), Che and Gale (1998) and Gavious et. al. (2002).
There are, however, several papers that examine the role of reserve prices
in second-price auctions with collusion, e.g. Graham and Marshall (1987)
and Kirkegaard (2005). In contrast to this paper, however, Graham and
Marshall (1987) and Kirkegaard (2005) examine reserve prices in isolation,
rather than in conjunction with ceilings.
2 The Model
A seller plans to sell an indivisible object to two bidders, 1 and 2 through a
second-price auction with a symmetric and random tie-breaking rule. The
1The US government, for example, sells timber rights, offshore oil leases, etc. through
auctions. Since 1994, auction theorists have designed spectrum sales in various countries,
e.g. electric power auctions in the United States (Milgrom (2004)).
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seller’s valuation of the object is zero. Bidder i’s valuation of the object, vi, is
private information. vi equals V with probability θ, and V with probability
1− θ, where V > V ≥ 0 and 0 < θ < 1.
Bidder i’s strategy is to announce a bid bi ∈ [0,M ], where M denotes a
bid-cap. Note that M ≥ V represents the case where there is no effective
bid-cap.
The sequence of actions is as follows.
Stage 1. The seller announces a cap of M , as well as a reserve price of
R, such that R ≤M ≤ V .
Stage 2. The bidders sequentially decide on whether to collude, or com-
pete. There is collusion if and only if both the bidders opt to collude.2
Stage 3. Bidder i, i ∈ {1, 2}, gets to know the realization of vi.
Stage 4. The bidders simultaneously announce their bids. In case there
is no collusion, each bidder i independently announces a bid bi ∈ [0,M ].
Whereas in the case there is collusion, bidder i bids min{vi, R}.
We assume that the bidders can commit to their collusive strategies.3
Such commitment may be justified on reputational grounds and is more
likely if the bidders also interact among themselves in other markets, so
that deviations from the collusive strategy may be penalized in these other
markets. Further, post-auction, the object cannot be redistributed.4
Colluding, however, involves a cost of C (> 0) for both the bidders. This
might arise because in case there is a suspicion that the bidders are colluding
among themselves, they may be blacklisted from future auctions by this, or
2We adopt the tie-breaking rule that in case of indifference the bidders prefer to compete
rather than collude.
3Our modelling strategy is similar to Eso and Schummer (2004) who also assume
that the bidders can commit to their collusive strategies. Alternatively, one can examine
collusive strategies that are incentive compatible (e.g. Graham and Marshall (1987)).
4Clearly the ex ante payoff of the bidders would be greater in case such re-distribution
is possible. This, however, may make collusion infeasible as it makes it easier to detect,
thus increasing the costs of collusion.
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other sellers.
We then use a backwards induction argument to solve the game.5
The collusive outcome.
Case 1. In case R ≤ V , recall that both the bidders bid R.6 Hence the
expected payoff of the bidders in stage 2
P ′(R) =
θV + (1− θ)V −R
2
− C, (1)
and that of the sellers
S′(R) = R. (2)
Case 2. In case R > V , a bidder bids V if her valuation is V , and bids
R if her valuation is V . Thus a bidder’s expected payoff in stage 2 is
P ′′(R) = θ(1− θ)(V −R) + θ
2(V −R)
2
− C, (3)
and that of the sellers
S′′(R) = θ(2− θ)R. (4)
The non-collusive outcome. We then consider the case where, in stage 2,
the bidders decide not to collude. Let Bi(M) denote the equilibrium bids of
the two bidders in stage 4. It is simple to see that the equilibrium involves
Bi(M) = min{vi,M}.
Case 1. R ≤ V .
1(a). R ≤ M ≤ V . Given the equilibrium bidding strategies, the
expected payoff of both the bidders in stage 2 is
P (M)|R≤M≤V = θV + (1− θ)V −M2 , (5)
5In the stage 4 subgame in case the bidders opt not to collude, we solve for the set of
undominated strategies. In case this is not a singleton, and bidding the true valuation is an
undominated strategy, then the selection rule is that the bidders bid their true valuations.
6The collusion scheme adopted here is related to the one in Eso and Schummer (2004).
However, while in our paper collusion is symmetric for R ≤ V , and the object is allocated
to the bidders randomly, in Eso and Schummer (2004) only the bribing bidder wins the
object.
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and that of the seller is
S(M)|R≤M≤V =M. (6)
1(b). R ≤ V < M ≤ V . Given the equilibrium bidding strategies, the
expected payoff of the bidders in stage 2 is
P (M)|M>V≥R = θ
2(V −M)
2
+ θ(1− θ)(V − V ), (7)
and that of the seller is
S(M)|M>V≥R = θ2M + (1− θ2)V . (8)
Case 2. V < R ≤ V . Clearly, in this case the bidders will bid
min{V ,M} if and only if their valuation is V . Otherwise they bid V . Thus
the expected payoff of the bidders in stage 2 is
P (M)|R>V = θ
2
2
(V −M) + θ(1− θ)(V −R). (9)
and that of the sellers is
S(M)|R>V = θ2M + 2θ(1− θ)R. (10)
We then solve for the optimal mechanism < R,M > that maximizes the
seller’s payoff. We need some notations. Let M∗(R) solve P (M)|R≤M≤V =
P ′(R). Hence
M∗(R) = R+ 2C. (11)
Similarly, let M∗∗(R) solve P (M)|M>V≥R = P ′(R), so that
M∗∗(R) =
R+ 2C + θ(1− θ)V − (1− θ)(2θ + 1)V
θ2
. (12)
Note that there are two policies available to the seller for controlling
collusion, M and R. Proposition 1 below shows that, under the appropriate
parameter conditions (in particular for intermediate values of C), the opti-
mal mechanism involves using both ceilings and reserve prices. We proceed
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as follows. In the absence of collusion, the payoff of the bidders is decreasing
in M for all M > V (see (7) and (9)). Thus a bid-cap of M may, by increas-
ing P (M), encourage non-collusive behavior by the bidders. Moreover, from
(6), (8) and (10), note that the expected payoff of the seller is increasing in
M . Thus, for M > V ,7 the seller would like to charge the highest possible
M that ensures non-collusive behavior by the bidders.
Further, from (1), note that the bidders’ payoff under collusion is de-
creasing in R for R ≤ V . Similarly, from (3), the bidder’s payoff under
collusion is decreasing in R for R > V . Let us consider the set of (R,M)
such that collusion is prevented and R ≤ V . We identify the vector in this
set such that R is maximized. This ensures that the corresponding M is
the maximum possible among all (R,M) in this set. We then identify a
similar mechanism from the set of (R,M) such that collusion is prevented
and R > V . A comparison of seller payoffs under these two mechanisms
yields the optimal mechanism.
Proposition 1. The optimal mechanism < R,M > involves
(a) Suppose V (1 + θ) ≤ 2V θ. Then R =M = V .
(b) Suppose V (1 + θ) > 2V θ. Then
R =M = V , if C ≤ θV−V (1−θ+θ2)2 ,
R = V and M =M∗∗(V ) < V , if θV−V (1−θ+θ
2)
2 < C ≤ (V−V )θ(2θ−1)2 ,
R = V and M = V , if (V−V )θ(2θ−1)2 < C.
Proof. To begin with, recall that M∗(R) solves P (M)|M≤V = P ′(R).
Thus for any V ≥ M > M∗(R), there will be collusion. Similarly, recall
that M∗∗(R) solves P (M)|M>V = P ′(R). Hence there will be collusion
whenever M > M∗∗(R) ≥ V .
First consider the case where R ≤ V . Observe that the expected payoff of
7Note that any mechanism that involvesM < V cannot be optimal as, from the seller’s
point of view, it is always dominated by a posted price mechanism with a price of V .
Similarly, any mechanism (R,M) such that M = V , is dominated by another mechanism
(R′,M ′) with R′ = V and M ′ = V + , where  > 0 is sufficiently small.
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the seller is increasing in M . Since M∗(R) and M∗∗(R) are both increasing
in R, it is optimal to set R = V and M = min{M∗∗(V ), V }.8
It is easy to see that M∗∗(V ) < V if and only if
2C < (V − V )θ(2θ − 1). (13)
Thus the expected payoff of the seller under < R,M > |R≤V is
2C + θ(1− θ)V + (1− θ + θ2)V , (14)
if (13) holds. Otherwise, it is
θ2V + (1− θ2)V . (15)
We next consider the case where V < R ≤ V . Note that for R = V (=
M), from equations (3) and (9), the bidders opt not to collude. Moreover,
from equations (4) and (10), this maximizes the seller’s payoff. Next, from
(10), for M = R = V , the seller’s payoff is
θ(2− θ)V . (16)
Finally we compare the seller’s payoff under (14), (15) and (16). The
seller’s payoff under (14) is at least as much as that under (16) if and only
if C ≥ θV−V (1−θ+θ2)2 . Similarly, the seller’s payoff under (15) is at least as
much as that under (16) if and only if V (1 + θ) ≥ 2V θ. Proposition 1 now
follows from the observation that the interval [ θV−V (1−θ+θ
2)
2 ,
(V−V )θ(2θ−1)
2 ]
is well defined if and only if V (1 + θ) > 2V θ.
Let us consider Proposition 1(a). In this case V (1+θ) ≤ 2V θ. Note that
this condition ensures that, in the absence of any collusive possibilities, the
optimal mechanism involves a posted price mechanism with a price of V .
Since such a mechanism also rules out collusive possibilities, R =M = V is
optimal even when collusion is possible.
8It is straightforward to check that M∗∗(V ) > V .
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The above argument suggests that for any other possibility to emerge we
must have that V (1+θ) > 2V θ.9 This case is considered in Proposition 1(b).
We find that the optimal policy involves an effective bid-cap (coupled with a
reserve price) whenever C is at an intermediate level. The intuition behind
ceilings is as follows. Suppose the bidders are competing among themselves.
Then ceilings reduce competition among the bidders. This increases the
bidders’ payoff from competition, so that the bidders have less incentive
to collude. We then consider the use of reserve prices. In the absence of
collusion, the seller’s payoff is increasing in the ceiling price. Reserve prices
reduce the bidders’ payoffs from collusion, thus reducing their incentive to
collude. This allows the seller to set a higher ceiling price, hence the result.
For other values of C, however, the optimal policy does not involve an
effective ceiling. In case C is small, preventing collusion through an effective
ceiling leads to a very low ceiling price. Hence the seller’s payoff would be
rather small, and be dominated by a posted price mechanism with a price
of V . Whereas if C is large, then there is little incentive for collusion.
Hence setting R = V is sufficient to prevent collusion and a bid-cap is not
required. Moreover, this dominates setting R = V , since the bidders with
low valuations are not ruled out in this case.
3 Conclusion
In a simple second-price auction we examine the role of ceilings and reserve
prices in controlling collusion. Under the appropriate parameter conditions,
the optimal policy involves an effective ceiling (coupled with a reserve price)
as long as collusion is neither too easy, nor too difficult. Thus, even though
apparently anti-competitive, ceilings may promote competition by prevent-
ing collusion among agents. Further, in this case the optimal policy also
involves a reserve price since it allows the seller to set a higher ceiling price
9This is likely to hold if θ is not too large, and V is not too large compared to V . This
is satisfied for example, if θ = 0.65, V = 2 and V = 2.5.
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and still prevent collusion.
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